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: Children, Armed Conflict, and Genocide

CHILDREN, ARMED CONFLICT, AND GENOCIDE: APPLYING THE
LAW OF GENOCIDE TO THE RECRUITMENT AND USE OF
CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT
Jeffery R. Ray*
ABSTRACT
This paper shows that the use of child soldiers in armed conflict has the
potential to be considered as genocide. A brief background of genocide is
presented prior to the analysis. Part I of the analysis will discuss three issues: first,
the modern understanding of genocide and the substantive areas of law that govern
it; second, the definition of “child” within the international arena as it relates to
child soldiering; third, a discussion to determine if children can constitute a
“group” in the context of the law of genocide.
Part II provides a discussion elaborating on Part I, then analyzes the five
disjunctive elements of genocide. A general rule will be synthesized for each
element. General rules are synthesized from judicial decisions interpreting the
genocide regime, soft law, and scholarly writings. Each element includes an
analysis to determine applicability of the element as it relates to child soldiers.
INTRODUCTION
The use, or recruitment, of child soldiers can potentially be punished under the
genocide regime following criteria established by the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda in deciding the case of Jean Paul Akayesu. Primarily, the case
analysis concludes that females constitute a group, or at least a subgroup, of such
import that the genocide regime is applicable,1 and is the anchor to which this
article is moored. Due to the historically unclear age of majority regarding persons
in armed conflict, this article provides a substantive analysis dedicated to
determining the age of majority for purposes of clarity.
United Nations reports, since 1998, specified that the “changing nature of
conflict put children at a higher risk than ever before.”2 Previous statistics
accentuate the magnitude of the preceding statement. Armed conflicts, from 1987
________________________
*
The author is a practitioner in central Florida. He possesses an LL.M., with commendation honors,
from the University of Aberdeen. He attained his J.D. in the top third of his class at Florida A&M University,
College of Law. The author studied human rights law and the law of armed conflict at Florida A&M University
and the University of Oxford.
1.
See Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 731 (Sept. 2, 1998).
2.
Special Rep. of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Report of the Special Rep. of
the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, ¶ 3, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/65/219 (Aug. 4, 2010), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/65/219.
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to 1997, have had devastating effects on children.3 Specifically, children have been
killed, maimed, and displaced from their homes in mass numbers: “2 million
children have been killed; 6 million children have been maimed, injured, or
permanently disabled; 1 million children have been orphaned or separated from
their parents.”4 The Special Representative for the Secretary-General for Children
and Armed Conflict stated in his speech, in 1998, that:
[There were] [m]ore than 300,000 children under the age of 18 . . .
fighting in conflicts worldwide; [c]hildren account for one half of
the worldwide total of 24 million refugees and internally displaced
peoples; [an astounding] 90 per cent of the casualties in today’s
conflicts are civilians, including a large and increasing number of
children and women. By contrast, that number was only 5 per cent
in the First World War, rising to 48 per cent in the Second World
War.5
The ten-year “strategic review” (“Review”) of the Machel Report (1998)
reveals that the features of armed conflicts have changed as a result of
technological, political, and other reasons.6 Awareness and international concern
for children involved in or affected by armed conflict has risen.7 Efforts to reduce
or eliminate the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict have produced
some positive results since the Machel Report.8 The Review did not spend a
significant portion of its analysis on specific figures. Instead, the Review
recognized that the figures from the complex issues revolving around children in
armed conflict would yield “inaccurate” results.9
Relevant figures mentioned in the Review are staggering. Children around the
globe constitute over thirty-three percent of casualties from land mines and
unexploded-explosive ordinances.10 In the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

________________________
3.
Press Release, Special Rep. of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, SecretaryGeneral’s Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict Condemns Attacks on Civilians and Use of
Child Soldiers, U.N. Doc. HR/4388 (Nov. 5, 1998) [hereinafter Press Release, Secretary-General for Children and
Armed Conflict], available at http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/press-release/9Nov98/.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.
6.
See Special Rep. of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Report of the Special Rep.
of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, pt. 2, ¶¶ 9–15, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N.
Doc. A/62/228 (Aug. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Report for Children and Armed Conflict], available at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/62/228.
7.
See generally id.
8.
Id. Sri Lanka, Sudan, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lebanon, Israel, and the occupied
Palestinian territories, and Myanmar have all “committed” to increase their respective recognition of various
children’s rights. These results are not the maximum desired result from several of these nations. However,
economic and resource limitations play a role within the decisions of countries involved in or recovering from
armed conflict, or prolonged poverty. See id. at pt. 1, ¶¶ 31–49.
9.
Id. at pt. 2, ¶ 16.
10.
Id. at pt. 2, ¶ 18.
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children were the victims of over thirty-three percent of acts of sexual violence.11
There were “18.1 million children . . . among populations living with the effects of
displacement” surrounding armed conflict.12
The Review makes an important parallel with the impact of recent armed
conflicts on children, and those during the period preceding the original Machel
Report. The parallel is that the “impact on children remains as brutal as ever,”
with regard to armed conflict.13 The Review acknowledges that armed forces,
primarily non-state actors, are actively using children in large numbers.14 Their
roles include being used as “fighters, cooks, porters[,] . . . messengers, and [they
are also] . . . used for sexual purposes.”15
Genocide, the ultimate criminal penalty, should be the proper prosecutorial
method against those who use child soldiers, when available. Children have been
involved in armed conflict as long as mankind has engaged in it.16 Such can be
seen in the Israelite destruction of much of Canaan and the Roman decimation of
Carthage.17 Recent evolution in warfare technology, such as the advent of compact
assault rifles, has increased the use of children in armed conflict.18 The subsequent
loss of innocence, deprivation of culture, and the obvious loss of the life of child
soldiers are all direct reasons to ensure the highest degree of penalty available
against those who use child soldiers.
This paper seeks to prove that the use of child soldiers in armed conflict has the
potential to be considered as genocide. Genocide, since World War II, has
generally been considered as an offense committed with a special intent or dolus
specialis.19 This special “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic,
racial or religious group” that meets any of the five requisite categories of harm
under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(“Genocide Convention”), the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(“Rome Statute”), or International Criminal Court jurisprudence.20 This factor is
________________________
11.
Id. at pt. 2, ¶ 21 (citing U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on Children and
Armed Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ¶ 40, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2007/391 (June 28, 2007)).
12.
Report for Children and Armed Conflict, supra note 6, at pt. 2, ¶ 25.
13.
Id. at pt. 2, ¶ 16 (emphasis added).
14.
See id. at pt. 2, ¶ 19.
15.
Id.
16.
See UNICEF, STATE OF THE WORLD’S CHILDREN 1996, at 13 (1996), available at
http://www.unicef.org/sowc/archive/ENGLISH/The%20State%20of%20the%20World%27s%20Children%20199
6.pdf; MATTHEW HAPPOLD, CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (Manchester University Press 2005).
17.
See ERIC D. WEITZ, A CENTURY OF GENOCIDE: UTOPIAS OF RACE AND NATION 8 (Princeton
University Press 2003). The author gives an interesting assertion of modern genocide becoming more “calculated”
and “systematic” in the twentieth century. The correlation with this “systematic” termination of populations would
be an interesting lens to look at the recent, extensive, use of children in the same time frame. There may indeed be
a method of “preemptively destroying” a future opposition by using their children in support of one’s militaristic
goals. Indoctrination of the children before they have the “tools” necessary may even provide a substantial
argument for the phenomena. See generally id.
18.
See HAPPOLD, supra note 16, 4–5.
19.
See Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶¶ 498, 517 (Sept. 2, 1998).
20.
See generally Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2, opened
for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter The Genocide Convention], available at
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/044/31/IMG/NR004431.pdf?OpenElement;
Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 6, opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
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case specific and is not necessary, for purposes of determining the plausibility of
this thesis, for a full analysis.
A brief background of genocide is presented prior to the analysis in Parts I and
II. Part I will discuss three issues: first, the modern understanding of genocide and
the substantive areas of law that govern it; second, the definition of “child” within
the international arena as it relates to child soldiering; third, a discussion to
determine if children can constitute a “group” in the context of the law of genocide.
Although the tactic of genocide is of ancient design, this article primarily
addresses the modern concept as it is covered in international law. The Genocide
Convention and the Rome Statute are the primary sources for the law of genocide
as presented in this analysis. Judicial interpretations of the Genocide Convention
and the Rome Statute are key advancements that are relied upon for this analysis.
The legal age of majority has been an issue when discussing child soldiering.21
Consensus on the age of fifteen has appeared to crystallize as the age of majority
through the supermajority of signatories on the Convention on the Rights of the
Child.22 This crystallization, if in fact the age did crystallize, was quickly put into
dispute.23 Ultimately, this analysis will acknowledge the normative shifts on the
age of majority and prescribe an age commensurate with the progressive shift in
the normative age. The more progressive argument is that Protocol I24 coupled with
state practice or declarations by states has established eighteen, or at a minimum
seventeen, as the age of majority for recruitment or use in active combat.25
Understanding issues regarding and establishing a normative age for a person to be
recruited or serve in active combat provides clarity for the remainder of the
analysis. However, it should be noted this is a subsidiary matter of this paper.
Part II provides a discussion elaborating on Part I then analyzing the five
disjunctive elements of genocide. A general rule will be synthesized for each
element. These general rules are synthesized from judicial interpretations of the
Genocide Convention and its subsequent adaptation, the Rome Statute or variations
thereof, by International Criminal Tribunals. Each element includes an analysis to
determine applicability of the element as it relates to child soldiers.
The Rome Statute], available at http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf; see also Akayesu, Case
No. ICTR-96-4-T.
21.
See Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 1, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3,
[hereinafter
Convention
on
the
Rights
of
the
Child],
available
at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/44/25 (allowing each State’s law to determine the
age of majority for purposes of defining a child under the convention).
22.
See generally INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW, VOLUME II: PRACTICE, PARTS 1 & 2, at 3109–27 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise
Doswald-Beck eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) [hereinafter CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW], available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-international-humanitarian-law-ii-icrceng.pdf (outlining the law and practice of various nations in regards to the recruitment of child soldiers).
23.
See generally CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 22. For example, upon
ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Netherlands, Spain, and Uruguay all expressed
disagreement with the Convention permitting the recruitment of children at the age of 15. See id. at 3110.
24.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in
Armed Conflict, opened for signature Feb. 12, 2002, 2173 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter Protocol I], available at
https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/docs/A_Res_54_263-E.pdf.
25.
See CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 22, at 3109–27; see also Protocol
I, supra note 24, at art. 1.
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The initial discussion of Part II is required to determine whether the subsequent
elements of genocide can be applicable to children as a group. In this part,
“[genocidal] intent to destroy, in whole or in part, . . . [members of the] group” is
analyzed in context with the intent of the Genocide Convention, Rome Statute, and
other international responsibilities.26
The five elements are analyzed to indicate the strength, or weakness, of each
element as applied to the law of genocide. First, “[k]illing members of the group”
is analyzed to determine applicability to children as a group.27 Second, “[c]ausing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group” is analyzed while taking
attributes of children into account.28 Third, “[d]eliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part” provides opportunity to analyze basic health needs to intentional harm
inflicted upon child soldiers.29 Fourth, “[i]mposing measures intended to prevent
births within the group” is an aspect that is confidently applied to girl soldiers.
Young boy soldiers must also be analyzed for a more complete discussion. Fifth,
“[f]orcibly transferring children of the group to another group” is a prominent issue
within the use of children, as well as within the Genocide Convention, that requires
discussion.30
The Genocide Convention of 1948 was in response to the atrocities committed
against Jewish and other minority groups during World War II.31 German national
trials which prosecuted Nazi soldiers that killed, or were accomplices to killing,
over 300,000 people under the crime of murder were superfluous:32 convicting one
of murdering 300,000 persons is of little difference, regarding sentencing, than of
one who murders thirty persons.33 Criminal proceedings were limited to murder
charges under German law once the statute of limitations ran out on all but the
charge of murder.34 The social harm to humanity of the Nazi atrocities required a
definition that could adequately describe the harm inflicted during World War II.
Raphael Lemkin was a prominent figure in carving out the definition of genocide
for the international community.35 This newly chargeable offense, genocide,
alleviated the superfluous charges resulting from mass killings under certain
circumstances.

________________________
26.
See The Genocide Convention, supra note 20; see also The Rome Statute, supra note 20.
27.
See infra Part II.B. See also The Genocide Convention, supra note 20.
28.
See infra Part II.C. See also The Genocide Convention, supra note 20.
29.
See infra Part II.D. See also The Genocide Convention, supra note 20.
30.
See infra Part II.F. See also The Genocide Convention, supra note 20.
31.
See TASK FORCE FOR INT’L COOPERATION ON HOLOCAUST EDUC., REMEMBRANCE AND RESEARCH,
2010 EDUCATION WORKING GROUP PAPER ON THE HOLOCAUST AND OTHER GENOCIDES 11 (2010), available at
http://www.un.org/en/holocaustremembrance/EWG_Holocaust_and_Other_Genocides.pdf.
32.
See generally NATHAN STOLTZFUS & HENRY FRIEDLANDER, NAZI CRIMES AND THE LAW 28–33
(Cambridge University Press 2008) (outlining the issues with prosecuting and sentencing Nazi soldiers in
Germany in the 1960s and 1970s).
33.
See id. at 28–29.
34.
Id. at 28.
35.
See TASK FORCE FOR INT’L COOPERATION ON HOLOCAUST EDUC., REMEMBRANCE AND RESEARCH,
supra note 31; see also WEITZ, supra note 17, at 8–9.
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International law has expanded upon the original Genocide Convention due to
it being tailored to the events of the Shoah.36 The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court was one expansion of the Geneva Convention.37 The Preamble of
the Rome Statute elucidated, “during [the past] century millions of children,
women, and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock
the conscience of humanity.”38 An International Criminal Tribunal has produced
jurisprudence that interprets the concept of genocide.39
Jurisprudence from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has
established that genocide can be applied more broadly than previously
contemplated—specifically relating to acceptable groups under genocide statutes.40
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda clearly articulated that women, as
a subgroup of Tutsi, were to be recognized as a group under genocide on the basis
of the intent of the drafters of the Genocide Convention “which, according to the
travaux préparatoires, was clearly to protect any stable and permanent group.”41
This interpretation serves as the springboard for this paper by providing a legal
framework to analogize children to women as articulated in Akayesu. The
circumstances may differ, regarding types of atrocities, but the underlying analysis
provides a solid framework for applying genocide to using or recruiting children
for use in armed conflict.
“Genocide” is a term derived by international jurist Raphael Lemkin.42 Lemkin
spent a great deal of effort to articulate the type of extermination, which the Nazi
Regime committed against the Jewish people, and others, during the Shoah.43 The
term “genocide” quickly received support toward codification, as shown by the
enactment of the statutes under the Genocide Convention within four years
following the close of World War II.44 The 1948 Genocide Convention has been
interpreted by codification and jurisprudence since its original establishment in
1948.45
The International Criminal Court (“ICC”) codified the definition regarding
genocide to be the applicable template that has been adopted by other tribunals.46
Initially, the Rome Statute was the result of an initiative to establish an ICC to
apply the law as collectively established to the most serious crimes recognized by
the international community.47 Ad hoc tribunals, specifically the International
________________________
36.
This article addresses what is commonly known as the “Holocaust,” instead of the “Shoah” due to any
issues regarding cultural sensitivity.
37.
See The Rome Statute, supra note 20, at art. 8.
38.
See The Rome Statute, supra note 20, at pmbl (emphasis added).
39.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (Sept. 2, 1998).
40.
Id. at ¶ 701.
41.
Id.
42.
See WEITZ, supra note 17, at 8.
43.
See id.
44.
Id. at 8–9.
45.
See generally id. (Weitz’s book discusses the implications of genocide across multiple historical
precedents).
46.
See generally Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J.
INT’L L. 22, 30 (1999).
47.
See id. at 29–30.
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Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, have interpreted the Rome Statute to include groups
and forms of acts not previously understood to fall within the purview of the Rome
Statute.48 The various tribunals adopted versions of the Rome Statute and expanded
according to the surrounding circumstances. “Genocide” has been interpreted by ad
hoc tribunals such as: the ICC; the East Timor Special Panels for Serious Crimes;
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia; the Supreme Iraqi
Criminal Tribunal (“SICT”); the Special Court for Sierra Leone; the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia. 49
An interpretation by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has
established mass rape, of women as a form of genocide.50 This interpretation is an
expansion on the ideology or conceptualization of what constitutes a group within
the meaning of genocide. Further, this opens the door to the consideration that
children are harmed as much—if not more—through armed conflict. This paper
asserts that this group, children, deserve to be recognized as a group or at least a
subgroup of such substantive import to be within the scope of genocide as defined
by Akayesu.
ANALYSIS
PART I
A. Genocide
The Genocide Convention etched into international law the modern foundation
of the crime of genocide.51 Treaties and customary international law are the sources
of international law that govern genocide.52 There are currently 144 contracting
parties to the Genocide Convention.53 The Convention entered into force on
January 12, 1951.54 The nearly sixty-year-old convention has shown how the
overwhelming majority of the world has formed the basis for this customary
international law to be binding upon those that have not become a party to the
________________________
48.
The purview of the Rome Statute is limited to offenses such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes, as defined. The International Tribunal for Rwanda adds violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol II, as defined. See The International Criminal Court and Ad Hoc
International Criminal Tribunals, COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/FS-CICC-AdHocTribunals_current.pdf (last updated Sept. 9, 2005).
49.
See GIDEON BOAS, JAMES L. BISCHOFF, & NATALIE L. REID, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
PRACTITIONER LIBRARY, at 136–140. Also noted is the SICT is also known as the Iraqi High Command (IHC),
and discussed within International Criminal Law Practitioner are the difficulties of translating the Tribunal names
into English. Id.
50.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (Sept. 2, 1998).
51.
See Johan D. van der Vyver, Prosecution and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 23 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 286, 288–90 (1999).
52.
Id. at 290–91.
53.
Chapter
IV
Human
Rights,
UNITED
NATIONS
TREATY
COLLECTION,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited
Mar. 24, 2014).
54.
Id.
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Convention. Genocide is now considered to be jus cogens.55 The Genocide
Convention defines the required elements, mens rea and actus reus, in order to
qualify as genocide.56
The Genocide Convention was written to codify principles of law to punish
and deter the act of genocide after World War II.57 The convention was broad
enough to expressly cover the societal needs of the post World War II era. Thus,
the Genocide Convention is the modern origin of the law of genocide as it relates
to modern rule of law. Similar to most laws, the convention has endured due to its
ability to be interpreted, through a loose form of stare decisis and sovereign
interpretation, to meet the slowly changing needs of humanity.58
The Convention was utilized in the formulation of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court.59 The Rome Statute defined the subject matter
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.60 Subject matter jurisdiction of the
ICC specifically includes, and has produced jurisprudence regarding genocide.
Genocide law can also be traced to the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremburg under crimes against humanity. The Nuremberg Charter was
essentially a furtherance of the Treaty of London, which was signed by the Allied

________________________
55.
56.

See van der Vyver, supra note 51, at 287.
The Genocide Convention, supra note 20. The Genocide Convention states, in relevant portion:
ARTICLE II; In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such: (a) [k]illing members of the group; (b) [c]ausing serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the group; (c) [d]eliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) [i]mposing
measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) [f]orcibly transferring children of
the group to another group.
ARTICLE III; The following acts shall be punishable: (a) [g]enocide; (b) [c]onspiracy to
commit genocide; (c) [d]irect and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) [a]ttempt to
commit genocide; (e) [c]omplicity in genocide.

Id.
57.
See van der Vyver, supra note 51, at 286–87.
58.
See generally id. (van der Vyver states that “[recent genocide] cases are authority for the proposition
that the definition and scope of the crime of genocide as a proscription of customary international law have
developed well beyond the confines dictated by the wording of the Genocide Convention itself.”).
59.
See generally id. (describing the evolution from the Genocide Convention to the modern International
Criminal Court).
60.
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, A/Conf.183/9, 17 July 1998, (last
corrected on January 16, 2002), available at http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf.
“[G]enocide” means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) [k]illing members of the
group; (b) [c]ausing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c)
[d]eliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part; (d) [i]mposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group; (e) [f]orcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Id.
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Powers in August of 1945.61 Genocide is impliedly found in the “persecution”
section of crimes against humanity as written in the Nuremberg Charter.62
B. Eighteen Years of Age Is the Progressively Emerging Age of Majority
to Be Recruited or Utilized as a Soldier Under International Treaty and
Customary Law of Armed Conflict
Under customary international law, there is a progressive argument that the
minimum age for a person to be recruited into or involved in active combat is
trending toward eighteen years of age.63 This is derived from the normative shifts
in the practices and statements or declarations of nations coupled with treaties that
have codified this emergence in international law.64 Discussion shall ensue with the
concept that the previous international treaty and crystallized customary law that
the age of majority is fifteen years, has likely begun to shift toward the normative
age of eighteen as the age of majority for use in armed conflict.65
Most nations are contracting parties to the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC)66 and its Optional Protocol on Children and Armed
Conflict (Protocol I).67 Protocol I codified the modern prevailing state practice,
which has arguably altered the normative age from the established age of fifteen to
an age closer to eighteen.68 The increase in age for persons to be used in combat in
Protocol I is prima facie evidence of this shift. The evidence is in the form of a
declaration from the international community that the acceptable normative
regarding the age of combatants has, at a minimum, begun to shift if it has not
already shifted.
This norm has shifted markedly since World War II. The original CRC was a
large leap forward in codifying the normative that children were not to be used in
armed conflict until reaching the age of fifteen.69 The Protocol to the CRC was a
codification of the rapid subsequent shift in the normative age for participation in
armed conflict. This subsequent and swift shift in international law did, however,
leave a gap in the protection of children from the age of fifteen to seventeen years
of age. The Protocol was quickly framed to address the issue via indicating the
shifting norm and codifying the normative shift in a manner that allowed states to
________________________
61.
See, e.g., ELLIS WASHINGTON, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: LAST TRAGEDY OF THE HOLOCAUST 73–74
(University Press of America, Inc. 2008).
62.
See generally id.
63.
See generally Ann Davison, Child Soldiers: No Longer a Minor Incident, 12 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L.
& DISP. RESOL. 124 (2004) (Davidson discusses the age of child combatants in militarized countries, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and her own recommendations for more clear regulations of child soldiers).
64.
See, e.g., id.
65.
See, e.g., EVE LA HAYE, WAR CRIMES IN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS 144–48 (Cambridge
University Press 2008).
66.
See The Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 21. The Convention set the age which one
can serve in active conflict, or be recruited to serve, in the military as fifteen years of age.
67.
See generally Protocol I, supra note 24 (Curious enough, the United States has become a party to this
treaty while remaining not a party to the parent CRC.).
68.
See id.
69.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 21, at art. 38, § 2.

Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2014

9

Barry Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 5

344

Barry Law Review

Vol. 19, No. 2

derogate from using persons eighteen and older if it was needed, so long as certain
criteria were met and not to utilize any child less than fifteen years of age.70
This codification has received the express support, via signatory to Protocol I,
of the majority of nations around the world. Specifically, the normative shift that
states are declaring, and for the majority of states actually practicing, is that
children ought not to be used in armed conflict.71 The original CRC and United
Nations declarations establish that children are to be the objects of special interest
and protections.72 In fact, the Protocol has 152 contracting parties as of January 7,
2014.73 The Protocol entered into force on February 12, 2002.74 Such widespread
acceptance, in addition to the nearly decade long history of the Protocol and
support from the major nations, is indicative of being applicable under customary
international law, even to those who have not signed the Protocol. This shows a
new humanitarian and human rights evolution, which nations are now just realizing
that children ought not to be used in armed conflict, but more importantly, nations
are pronouncing, declaring, and establishing new international norms through
treaty and practice that children ought not to be used in armed conflict.
Nations have a vested interest in protecting the children within their borders.
The children of today are the future of humanity and the leaders, workers, and
scholars of their nation’s future. As a result, the international community has
spoken out to declare eighteen as the accepted age required for one to be utilized in
military endeavors.75 However, nations have reserved, within Protocol I, the right
to utilize children should they not be able to recruit enough persons to maintain an
effective military.76 This is an expected clause to be placed in the Protocol
especially in the initial shift in normative age of combatants. Protocol I “outlaws”
the use of child soldiers in participating in active combat and the recruitment of
children for such purposes.77 The laws regarding armed conflict are decided by
nations of the global community; not by warlords, tyrants, and opportunists.
Argumentation based on recruitment and use of children in armed conflicts by
warlords, tyrants, or any other non-state actors is not relevant with determining
international law. However, there are over 300,000 children that are used in
conflicts globally.78 Therefore, the importance of determining where international
________________________
70.
Protocol I, supra note 24, at Annex I.
71.
See id.
72.
See, e.g., CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 22, at 3077; see also
Protocol I, supra note 24, at Annex I; see also Press Release, Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict,
supra note 3; see also A World Fit For Children, G.A. Res. S-27/2 (Oct. 11, 2002); see also G.A. Res. 62/141,
U.N. Doc. A/62/435 (Feb. 22, 2008); see also G.A. Res. 63/241, U.N. Doc. A/63/426 (Mar. 13, 2009).
73.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in
Armed Conflict, May 25, 2000, 2173 U.N.T.S. 222.
74.
Id.
75.
Protocol I, supra note 24, at Annex I.
76.
See, e.g., Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict, supra note 73.
77.
MICHAEL WESSELLS, CHILD SOLDIERS: FROM VIOLENCE TO PROTECTION 2 (Harvard University Press,
2006).
78.
Press Release, Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, supra note 3.
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law is now, regarding children in armed conflict, and where the law is going is of
paramount importance.
One could argue that Protocol I is not binding in that it does not require
contracting parties to criminalize conduct of state or other actors—it is an optional
protocol. This view is either flawed or supports the customary law argument that
the majority of nations have decided that the age of majority with regard to military
endeavors is eighteen (with reservations mentioned above). The number of nations
supporting Protocol I backed by the passage of time and state practice has
contributed to establishing a shift, or at a minimum the initiation of a shift, in the
normative age of majority regarding soldiers. The age of eighteen has arguably
become the international normative, accepted by states, as the age of majority in
active combat and in the recruitment of soldiers.79
Should a state require recruiting persons under the age of eighteen, then it is
necessary to define “active combat” and “recruitment” to ensure communication in
this article is accurate. It must be noted that different societies will have domestic
norms that differ, perhaps significantly. A fluid interpretation of Protocol I seems
to be possible under certain auspices, such as:
[Nations] that permit voluntary recruitment into their national
armed forces under the age of 18 shall maintain safeguards to
ensure, as a minimum, that: (a) [s]uch recruitment is genuinely
voluntary; (b) [s]uch recruitment is done with the informed
consent of the person’s parents or legal guardians; (c) [s]uch
persons are fully informed of the duties involved in such military
service; (d) [s]uch persons provide reliable proof of age prior to
acceptance into national military service.80
Active combat, as it relates to the CRC and its Protocol I, should be viewed as
“job oriented” if the nation affirmatively recruits underage soldiers. The modern
battlefield is no longer linear. Thus, it is not possible to ensure that a soldier
working in a support role will never see conflict. However, the non-combat arms
“jobs” have different roles and purposes within the military.81 This is significant in
light of the intense training one undergoes within the military. It is one thing to
possibly be near or observe combat; it is another to be trained to be the killer and
participate in combat—both can be extremely traumatizing. Perhaps an acceptable
median is a policy that would accept only those that are at least seventeen years of
age and allow the training time, subsequent to their voluntary enlistment, to elapse
the remaining time until the individual turns eighteen years of age. The United
________________________
79.
Compare Protocol I, supra note 24, with African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU
Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49, art. 2 (1990) (This treaty encompasses the African region and sets the legal age of
majority similar to that of the Optional Protocol I, as eighteen years of age).
80.
Protocol I, supra note 24 at art. 3.
81.
The “combat arms” role in a military is being defined as the portion of the military that is used to attack
or defend (to simplify), such as: the infantry, artillery, armor, etc. Non-combat arms in contrast is all other portions
of the military whose job is to perform support functions such as mail clerks, legal assistants, veterinarians, etc.
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States, for example, allows children over the age of seventeen to enlist in the
military with the consent of their parents and provides an intensive and relatively
lengthy training regimen that those children must complete in order to serve in the
United States military.82
The term “recruitment” under the CRC and its Protocol I is an ambiguous term.
“Recruitment” has been defined differently by various nations. One such variation
permits seventeen-year-olds to enlist in a volunteer army as operating within
Protocol I.83 On the other hand, this interpretation could be argued as a violation of
Protocol I; and such a violation may be argued as intentionally misconstruing
interpretation of Protocol I. Specifically, Protocol I could be read to indicate that
targeted recruitment of persons under the age of eighteen, without reason or need,
is prohibited. However, Protocol I bans the use of underage soldiers in active
combat, but permits derogation.84
The application banning the recruitment of or use of underage soldiers in active
combat is superfluous when compared with the complete ban on the active
recruitment of persons under the age of eighteen. The more efficient interpretation
of Protocol I interacts in harmony with the spirit of both restrictions regarding the
active combat and the active recruitment of persons under the age of eighteen.
Therefore, the intent of Protocol I is met by ensuring that persons under the age of
eighteen are not actively recruited and are not finished with their initial military
training until the age of eighteen.
C. Children Meet the Criteria Set Forth in Akayesu to Be a Group
Recognized Under the Law of Genocide
National, ethnic, racial, and religious groups are the expressed groups that are
identified in the Genocide Convention.85 Historically, genocide has been
understood to “not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except
when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation.”86 The Genocide
Convention recognized this and codified four specific groups and five elements
that could trigger the enforcement of the Genocide Convention.87 The members of
the Convention did leave out certain groups. Restricting recognition to members of
a nation was in view of the “exclusion of the more ‘mobile’ groups which one joins
through individual voluntary commitment, such as political and economic
groups.”88 However, Akayesu showed that there were “qualities” that could be used
________________________
82.
See 10 U.S.C. § 505(a) (2014).
83.
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in
Armed Conflict, supra note 73.
84.
See Protocol I, supra note 24 at art. 3.
85.
The Genocide Convention, supra note 20 at art. II.
86.
RAPHAEL LEMKIN, WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, & SAMANTHA POWER, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE:
LAWS OF OCCUPATION, ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS 79 (Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2d ed. 2008).
87.
The Genocide Convention, supra note 20 at art. II.
88.
Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 511 (Sept. 2, 1998).
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to determine if persons constitute a group as intended under the Genocide
Convention.89
Akayesu articulated “qualities” such as “not challengeable by its members, who
belong to it automatically, by birth, in a continuous and often irremediable
manner.”90 Akayesu represents jurisprudence that has established the above
qualities and further established that groups not expressly stated in the Genocide
Convention may be recognized under the Convention via the qualities that are
exhibited by a particular group.91
It is not viable to argue against a child being born into childhood—a class or
group of which the child will be a member until they reach the age of majority.
This is an irremediable trait that is exhibited by children and that trait is beyond
repute. Alternatively, children are the most important subgroup of any larger
group.92 This is true with regard to any national, ethnic, racial, religious, or any
other group within humanity. International law has repetitively acknowledged the
need to protect children.93 The reasoning for this heavy interest in the health,
welfare, and psychological well-being of children is sound. Children are the heirs
that will undoubtedly continue the legacy of each nation, ethnicity, race, and
religion. The destruction of this fragile underpinning of humanity ultimately leads
to the destruction of the group to which the children are a part.
The United Nations has identified government armed forces, paramilitary
groups, and armed opposition groups that are utilizing child soldiers.94 These
nations frequently have opposition groups attempting to seize the government of
their respective nations.95 These opposition groups are notorious for using children
________________________
89.
Id.
90.
Id.
91.
See id.
92.
See generally Protocol I, supra note 24.
93.
See generally CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 22.
94.
COALITION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS, WORLD MAP OF CHILD SOLDIERS, 2000/2001,
available at http://www.mickmaurer.com/files/child_soldiers.pdf. This map is an excellent device to show the use
of child soldiers is an issue that is widespread enough to cause concern. Yet, confined to a small enough of a group
of countries to show this is not the generally accepted norm. Attention must be placed with the fact that many of
the nations indicated within this map have children used by opposition groups and not by the national
governments. However, there are some governments that are utilizing child soldiers. Additionally, the purposes for
the use of children in these nations vary greatly and require more inquiry than this paper provides in order to
comprehend the intricacies involved from historical exploitation, international “willful blindness,” to simple
indifference based upon decades or centuries of ethnic or racial ideologies of supremacy.
List of Countries with Child Soldiers Fighting in Recent and Ongoing Conflicts (G:
government armed forces, P: paramilitaries, O: armed opposition groups) Colombia (P,O);
Mexico (P,O); Peru (O); Russian Federation (O); Turkey (O); Yugoslavia (former Rep. of)
(P,O); Algeria (P,O); Angola (G,O); Burundi (G,O); Chad (G); Republic of Congo (G,O);
Dem. Rep. of the Congo (G,O); Eritrea (G); Ethiopia (G); Rwanda (G,O); Sierra Leone
(G,P,O); Somalia (all groups); Sudan (G,P,O); Uganda (G,O); Iran (G,O); Iraq (G,O); Israel
and Occupied Territories (G,O); Lebanon (O); Afghanistan (all groups); India (P,O);
Indonesia (P,O); Myanmar (G,O); Nepal (O); Pakistan (O); Philippines (O); Solomon
Islands (O); Sri Lanka (O); East Timor (P,O);Tajikistan (O); Papua New Guinea (O);
Uzbekistan (O).
Id.
95.

Id.
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in order to further their own interests.96 Such destruction of youth is not acceptable
for one to commit or the international community to rhetorically scold. With an
understanding of the history and modern legal framework of genocide, a
determination of the legal age of a child, and that children can and must be
considered a group within the meaning of genocide, it is now proper to begin an
analysis of the elements of genocide as applied to child soldiering.
PART II
QUALIFICATION OF GENOCIDE, BY THE USE OF CHILDREN IN ARMED
CONFLICT, IS SHOWN THROUGH THE INTENT TO DESTROY IN WHOLE OR IN
PART ANY GROUP THROUGH ANY ONE OF THE FIVE DISJUNCTIVE ELEMENTS
OF GENOCIDE
There is a need to determine whether there is an argument under any of the five
disjunctive elements for genocide regarding the use of child soldiers. Each element
shall include a general rule guided by jurisprudential judgments that interpreted the
Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute. Specifically, Akayesu will be the
primary jurisprudence from which the general rules are derived in this paper.
Under each element, the general rule will be followed by an analysis of whether
there is a substantive argument for genocide under each individual element. First,
this section provides an analysis as to what is genocidal intent to “destroy, in whole
or in part . . . members of the group.”97
A. Genocidal Intent to Destroy in Whole or in Part Members of the
Group
Genocidal intent is “culpable” when one has committed an offense that is
covered by Article 2(a)–(e) of the Genocide Convention, or an equivalent statute
enacted in furtherance of the Genocide Convention, “with the clear intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group.”98 Culpability is established
because the offender “knew or should have known” his or her act would “destroy,
in whole or in part, a group.”99 For an act to be charged under the Genocide
Convention, or equivalent statute, the act must be against “one or several
individuals,” because the individual belongs to a group, and is targeted primarily
because of his or her membership to the group.100 This dolus specialis, or special
intent, is the key to explaining or defining genocidal intent.101
The limitation in the targeting of the group establishes the intent to “destroy, in
whole or in part, the group.”102 Specific intent can be established through
________________________
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
The Genocide Convention, supra note 20 at art. II.
Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 520 (Sept. 2, 1998) (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at ¶ 521.
Id. at ¶ 517.
Id. at ¶ 522.
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“inferring” facts from the offense as they occur in context with other factors.103 The
other factors can be “the scale of atrocities committed, their general nature, . . . [or]
deliberately and systematically targeting victims on account of their membership of
a particular group.”104 Additionally, the “exclusion” of other groups can “infer”
genocidal intent.105
Drafters of the Genocide Convention had the intent to deter acts of genocide
against any stable and permanent group.106 This interpretation of the Convention
was set forth in Akayesu.107 Akayesu determined that “it is particularly important to
respect the intention of the drafters of the Genocide Convention, which according
to the travaux préparatoires, was patently to ensure the protection of any stable
and permanent group.”108 Children are clearly a stable and permanent group.
Membership of this group is from birth until one reaches the age of majority. The
permanence of the group (i.e., children) will exist until the end of humanity itself.
Therefore, the “stable” and “permanent” criteria, as set forth in Akayesu, is met.
Children have been recognized repeatedly as a group to whom the world, or
“mankind,” owes a debt of recognition and special protection.109 When children are
sought out for recruitment purposes, to be used in armed conflict, those that seek
the children often show little intent other than simply choosing children because
they are children.110 One may view the perfect soldier as one that follows orders
without question. Children can and often are beaten and trained into these very
types of soldiers.111 Thus, children are targeted specifically for their mental
“pliability.”112 On the other hand, one could argue that children may be willing to
participate in armed conflict and are even treated as well as their adult counterparts.
Perhaps even given a monetary or property interest as compensation paid to either
the children or their families.113 This argument has a facial appeal to it, which
initially sounds reasonable. This reasonableness is quickly diminished when one
looks into the ability of a child to make sound decisions for him or herself. The
child’s family should not be given total authority to send their child to an armed
conflict so that they may reap a benefit. On the one hand, this may be viewed as the
child supporting his or her family. However, it is also a dominant position, which
reaps all the benefits of an agreement and the child is left to suffer all detriment,
mental and physical, that he or she receives from participating in armed conflict.
Children cannot generally make a rational and informed decision to serve in armed
________________________
103.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T at ¶ 517.
104.
Id. at ¶ 523 (emphasis added).
105.
Id.
106.
Id. at ¶ 517.
107.
See generally id.
108.
Id. at ¶ 516.
109.
See generally A World Fit for Children, G.A. Res. S-27/2f World Fit Fldren, rg Legacyay. om
itted ing the accidents for either of them.howed that the it was what he thought then it was, supra note 72; see also
Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 62/141 (Feb. 22, 2008).
110.
WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 35.
111.
f World Fit Fldren, rg Legacyay. om
itted ing the accidents for either of them.howed that the it was what he thought then it wasId.
112.
Id.
113.
Id. at 55.
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conflict and their families should not be permitted to make such a decision in their
stead without completely informing the child and gaining his or her complete and
genuine assent. Children have a reduced ability to understand the circumstances,
specifically, those involved in decisions regarding armed conflict.114 Therefore,
formal recognition of children as a group protected by the Genocide Convention is
an issue that is ripe within the international community. The judgment of Akayesu
has provided the jurisprudence needed to bolster the international effort to protect
children from being used in armed conflict.
B. Killing Members of the Group
“Killing” is a term that should be addressed due to its ambiguity. The
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has produced jurisprudence to interpret
the ambiguity of the term “killing.”115 There is a difference in the English and
French translations in the Genocide Convention.116 The difference of the two
translations is that the French version has additional inferences attached that add an
element of intent.117 The French version includes the word meurtre which indicates
a killing.118 More specifically, meutre indicates an intentional killing,119 whereas
the English word “killing” could refer to a death, which was unintentional. The
“precision” of the French version is “preferred.”120
Children are killed intentionally throughout the world during armed conflict.
One such method is to target children to terrorize towns or villages. The National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola has used the strategy of murdering
infants in order to terrorize locals in villages.121 Many more children are killed
through ordinance, nutritional deprivation, issues surrounding displacement due to
armed conflict, as well as poverty brought about due to killing the children’s
families.122
Child soldiers are prone to have their lives unnecessarily thrown away because
children are “exploitable” and “expendable.”123 In West Africa, the “shock value”
of young boys has been utilized by sending them into combat naked to terrorize the
opponent.124 The “shock value” of child soldiers in West Africa cannot be
summarized by only this one method of exploitation, they are also sent to
“spearhead” assault operations.125 Children are specifically chosen to go on suicide
missions because they do not have a “sense of morality” that has developed to a
point commensurate with that which is necessary to make sound decisions in
________________________
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See id. at 36.
Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 500 (Sept. 2, 1998).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 24.
Id. at 24–25.
Id. at 34.
Id.
Id.

https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol19/iss2/5

16

: Children, Armed Conflict, and Genocide

Spring 2014

Children, Armed Conflict, and Genocide

351

combat.126 This is evidenced through sending child soldiers through minefields to
clear the minefield for the adult soldiers.127 Terroristic use of children is another
form of exploitation of children in armed conflict.
In Afghanistan, multiple groups are recruiting children to carry out terrorist
activities. 128 Groups that recruit children for terroristic activities include the
“Taliban, the Haqqani network, Hezb-i-Islami, the Tora Bora Front, and Jamat
Sunat al-Dawa Salafia,” and these groups utilize “children as young as 13 and 14
years of age” by using children in “plant[ing] explosives” or by blowing
themselves up in “suicide attacks.”129
In Iraq, Al-Qaeda seems to be the primary group in recruiting children to
perform terrorist actions.130 Children have been “tricked, coerced[,] or enticed with
financial incentives” to perform “acts of terror” or, more specifically, to be “suicide
bombers.”131 Children in Iraq have been recruited to perform “acts of terror” as
young as “14 to 16 years of age.”132
Children are exploited as child soldiers. Children are chosen for their
developmental immaturity to perform tasks that they are not expected to live
through so that the more seasoned, older troops, that have been trained extensively
or have substantial training may be preserved.133 On the other hand, it must be
noted that the child soldiers have a greater level of security than those they rape,
rob, and pillage.134 Additionally, child soldiers may have a better diet than other
children in the area because they forcibly take food from others.135 In practice, it
may be extraordinarily difficult to parse the use of soldiers for the purpose of
conducting hostilities and using them for the purpose of exterminating the children
because they are children. However, one cannot make a sound argument that by
creating a larger evil, one is justified by exploiting a child through means that are a
lesser evil. It is clear that children are being intentionally killed in order to further
the interests of the groups that exploit them. Additionally, it is also damning that
children are specifically targeted for use in armed conflict due to the characteristics
of children as a group such as being young, pliable, and able to be indoctrinated
easily.
C. Causing Serious Bodily or Mental Harm to Members of the Group
Serious bodily or mental harm does not require the harm to be “permanent” or
“irremediable.”136 However, the harm does need to be “more than minor or
________________________
126.
Id. at 36.
127.
WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 37.
128.
Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, ¶ 47, G.A. Res. 64/742 (Apr. 13,
2010) [hereinafter Secretary-General Report on Children 2010].
129.
Id.
130.
Id. at ¶ 81.
131.
Id.
132.
Id.
133.
WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 37.
134.
Id. at 23.
135.
Id.
136.
Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 502 (Sept. 2, 1998).
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temporary impairment.”137 This threshold element need not be limited to bodily or
mental “acts of torture.”138 Nor should this element be limited to “inhumane or
degrading treatment” or “persecution” of a group.139 Akayesu specifically noted
that the mental harm inflicted upon rape victims qualifies as being protected under
genocide statutes.140
Serious bodily harm is presented in multiple ways. Battlefield casualties are
inherent to armed conflict and must be strategically considered by every
commander or leader in preparation of an attack. Military recruitment coerced by
physical and/or sexual violence can result in both bodily and mental harm. Superior
ranking military members may sexually abuse child subordinates.141 In addition,
children are forced or coerced into taking drugs to alter their state of mind.142
The mental trauma inflicted upon underage soldiers is massive. Children are
vulnerable to manipulation and unaware of the long-term psychological damage
being inflicted upon them. Notably, adults experience psychological trauma from
armed conflict.143 Certainly, adults are better equipped to psychologically deal with
the intense stress and gore present on the battlefield.144 In addition, adults have the
maturity to comprehend the magnitude of the decisions that are necessary for one
to make when in combat that affect their very ability to live through the
engagement. In contrast, children simply cannot appreciate the danger that is
presented to them in circumstances of armed conflict where the lack of maturity
devalues the significance of life itself.145
Mental damage resulting from armed conflict is manifested in various ways for
different cultures. Posttraumatic stress disorder is one possible result of the
“extreme traumatic stressor[s]” inflicted upon those used in armed conflict.146
________________________
137.
STEVEN R. RATNER, JASON S. ABRAMS, & JAMES L. BISCHOFF, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBURG LEGACY 31 (Oxford University Press 2009),
(Citing Semanza Trial Judgment, ¶ 320–22; Blagojevic and Jokic Trial Judgment, ¶ 645.).
138.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T at ¶ 504.
139.
Id.
140.
Id. at ¶ 508. “For instance, rape can be a measure intended to prevent births when the person raped
refuses subsequently to procreate, in the same way that members of a group can be led, through threats or trauma,
not to procreate.” Id.
141.
See, e.g., WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 97.
142.
Id. at 76–77.
143.
Id. at 129.
144.
Id. at 74 (stating that adults have more control over their emotions than children do, especially in
combat-type situations).
145.
See id. at 35–36.
146.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
463–65 (American Psychiatric Ass’n, 4th ed., text rev., 2000). The following passage is illustrative to show only
one of many possible forms of psychological damage, and the diagnostic measurements are substantially linked to
this topic:
Posttraumatic stress disorder . . . follow[s] exposure to an extreme traumatic stressor
involving direct personal experience of an event that involves actual or threatened death or
serious injury, or other threat to one’s physical integrity; or witnessing an event that
involves death, injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of another person; or learning
about unexpected or violent death, serious harm, or threat of death or injury experienced by
a family member or other close associate [such as fellow soldiers] (Criterion A1). . . . The
characteristic symptoms resulting from the exposure to the extreme trauma include
persistent reexperiencing of the traumatic event (Criterion B), persistent avoidance of
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African conflicts have caused more mental trauma to children than in other regions
of the world.
Girl soldiers, and girls generally, have a “visibly” higher rate of sexual
exploitation than their male counter parts.147 Underage girls are routinely sought, or
hunted, to fill the ranks of militaries which use child soldiers.148 Girl soldiers
perform a variety of matriarchal tasks that are additional to their military focus.149
Young females are brutalized until total obedience is achieved, then continually
beaten to ensure continued obedience.150 The psychological impact of the physical
and mental brutality inflicted through sexual exploitation of young females is far
reaching.
There is an undeniable link from the use of children in armed conflict to their
bodily and mental harm. The children who survive the ordeal of armed conflict
may be physically intact, or perhaps not. However, child soldiers are likely to have
suffered mental harm that will substantially damage them psychologically in a
manner that may be temporary or permanent. Furthermore, the damage inflicted
upon these children, due to their mental immaturity, would be analogous to victims
of torture and inhumane treatment. The use of children as a whole, or even as a
subgroup of another, in armed conflict and the resulting damage that occurs to the
children clearly shows that their use in armed conflict is substantial and temporally
sufficient to justify a charge of genocide against those who recruit or use them in
armed conflict.
D. Deliberately Inflicting upon the Group Conditions of Life Calculated
to Bring About its Physical Destruction in Whole or in Part
This element requires an act which is “calculated” to “ultimately” bring about
the “physical destruction” of a group through “inflicting on the group conditions . .
. to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.”151 The conditions are
not required to “immediately” destroy the group or to kill persons within the
stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness (Criterion C), and
persistent symptoms of increased arousal (Criterion D). . . . Traumatic events that are
experienced directly include, but are not limited to, military combat, violent personal assault
(sexual assault, physical attack, robbery, mugging), being kidnapped, being taken hostage,
terrorist attack, torture, incarceration as a prisoner of war[.] . . . Witnessed events include . .
. observing the serious injury or unnatural death of another person due to violent assault,
accident, war, or disaster or unexpectedly witnessing a dead body or body parts. Associated
descriptive features . . . [include] impaired affect modulation; self-destructive and impulsive
behavior; dissociative symptoms; somatic complaints; . . . shame, despair, or hopelessness;
feeling permanently damaged; a loss of previously sustained beliefs; hostility; social
withdrawal; feeling constantly threatened; impaired relationships with others; or a change
from the individual’s previous personality characteristics.
Id.
147.
See WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 85–106.
148.
See id. at 86.
149.
Id. at 86. Matriarchal duties in this context are such that the female performs because it is her ‘duty’ in
the setting. These duties would entail cooking and cleaning, among other duties, for the other male soldiers. Id.
150.
Id. at 88–89, 93–95.
151.
Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 505 (Sept. 2, 1998).
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group.152 “[S]ubjecting a group of people to a subsistence diet, systematic
expulsion from homes and the reduction of essential medical services below
minimum requirement” are ways in which conditions of life can be controlled to
bring about the physical destruction of a group.153
There is an argument that the conditions placed upon child soldiers are
commensurate to being calculated to bring about their destruction in whole or in
part. The children endure hardships from the moment of contact with many armed
groups.154 Child soldiers are forced to perform grueling marches;155 if not
completed, the child is subject to extreme discipline or viciously killed.156 Often
these killings are by fellow child soldiers, who are forced to kill the child that
cannot continue on.157 Heavy labor and famine are especially hard on child
soldiers, as they dare not show weakness or defiance.158 Drugs are given to, and
sometimes forced upon, child soldiers.159 Children are given these pills to be
“fearless.”160 In essence, the children are shaped to be totally physically,
psychologically, and chemically dependent upon the armed group to which they are
a part. Severity of the above-mentioned conditions should be weighed to determine
whether the conditions of life have been inflicted to bring about the destruction of
the children. A combination of the above harms may, or just a significant harm that
is severe enough could, destroy in part children as a group or as the subgroup of
another nation, ethnicity, race, or religion.
E. Imposing Measures Intended to Prevent Births from Within the
Group
Measures that are “intended to prevent births within the group” will subject a
perpetrator to genocide statutes.161 Examples of “intending” to “prevent births” are
“sexual mutilation, the practice of sterilization, forced birth control, separation of
the sexes and prohibition of marriages.”162
In Afghanistan, young boy soldiers are “at great risk of sexual exploitation.”163
Boys make up the “overwhelming majority” of fourteen to eighteen year old
children exploited by armed groups in Afghanistan.164 It is recognized that sexual
violence in Afghanistan is a “widespread phenomenon.”165 The practice of bacha
________________________
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id. at ¶ 506.
See WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 57.
Id. at 61, 92.
Id.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 57–84.
Id. at 76.
See, e.g., WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 76–77.
See Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 507 (Sept. 2, 1998).
Id.
WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 97.
Id.
Secretary-General Report on Children 2010, supra note 128, at ¶ 49.
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bazi, sexual slavery of a young male, is prevalent enough to become a “matter of
concern” for the international community.166
Charging those who rape child soldiers with the crime of genocide is
supportable by Akayesu.167 The induction of a female soldier into armed groups is
particularly one that has a propensity of sexual violence.168 The mental harm
experienced by a raped child soldier can result in extensive psychological problems
to a child. For instance, if the sexual abuse is so severe that the children do not
wish to have future sexual relations, then that underscores a reasonable argument
that genocide has been committed.169 There may be difficulty in getting children, or
those that eventually reach adulthood, to admit that the sexual violence committed
against them occurred,170 much less, have them explain the rationale behind why
they do not want to have sexual relations in the present. These are complex issues.
Not only is there sexual violence and shame associated with it, but there are other
factors in play as well, such as the stigma of being a “child soldier.” Such stigma
can ostracize someone who is a former underage soldier.
Both civilian children and children that are recruited and used in armed conflict
have a vulnerability to being raped.171 However, the added stress and pressure from
those in authoritative positions in armed groups present an additional set of factors
that are not present in civilian children that are raped.
In the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”), young girls are
not as prone to physical sexual violence.172 Instead, commanders use money and
power to influence young girls into becoming their “wife” and substitute physical
dominance with coercion through influence as a method of exploitation.173 In the
end, children are subject to psychologically damaging sexual abuse by force or
coercion by armed groups.174 Civilians in areas near armed groups are at risk of
being raped by members of those groups. Child soldiers of armed groups that do
not ban sexual violence are also constantly in danger of rape, abuse, and
humiliation.175 The impact of this exploitation can cause reluctance or refusal to
procreate willingly once the children reach adulthood and acclimate back into the
civilian world.176
The repeated raping of the female soldier may be arguable as designed to
prevent births due to many reasons, one of which could be physical damage
because the raping of female soldiers is often done to keep her in her “place.”177
________________________
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
note 77.
172.
173.
174.
175.
86–87.
176.
177.

Id.
See generally Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T.
See WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 89.
See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T at ¶ 508.
See WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 85.
See generally Secretary-General Report on Children 2010, supra note 128; see also WESSELLS, supra
WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 95–96.
See id.
See id.
See Secretary-General Report on Children 2010, supra note 128, at ¶ 20; WESSELLS, supra note 77, at
See WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 94.
Id.
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Whereas an extended reliance of a young male subject to bacha bazi would
arguably diminish his ability to perform customary roles required for passing along
the traditional rituals for the continuance of their religious or cultural
background.178
Child soldiers are being targeted due to their membership in the group of
children because they are pliable, physically incapable of resisting, and because
they will be shamed into staying with the armed group out of shame resulting from
being raped.179 Once children are brought into the fold it is easy to see how they
could lose hope under the circumstances placed in front of them.
F. Forcibly Transferring Children of the Group to Another Group
One forcibly transfers children of a group to another when there is a “direct
act,” “threat” to act, or “trauma which would lead to the forcible transfer of
children from one group to another.”180 There is a strong argument for the charge
of genocide in forcible transfer, particularly with children as a group being targeted
for their vulnerability to be hunted and forced from their natural or community
group to the armed group that takes them.
Somalia, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Uganda, and many
other countries have armed groups such as: “Al-Shabaab” in Somolia; the “armee
nationale tchadienne[,]” known as ANT in Chad; “Forces armées de la Republique
democratique du Congo[,]” known as the FARDC, “Mai-Mai factions,” the
“Patriotes resistants congolais[,]”… the Forces democratiques de liberation du
Rwanda[,]” also known as the FDLR, and the “Congrès national pour la défense du
peuple[,]” known as the CNDP all in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; the
“Sudan People’s Liberation Army[,]” known as the SPLA in the Sudan; and the
“Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda.”181 These groups use a variety of
tactics to recruit children. Some of the common evasive tactics are to forcibly enter
homes, extract children, and forcibly take the children to assimilate into their
armed groups.182 To take a child from its family, tribe, ethnic, national, or religious
group and to attempt to force the child to adapt or be brutalized into the armed
group is a prima facie argument for the forcible transfer of children from one group
to another. Once children are assimilated into an armed group and subjected to
armed conflict and sexual violence or exploitation, they are likely to have
substantial issues acclimating back into their original group, if they ever get the
opportunity to return.183 The children’s core values, their outlook on life, and
respect for individuals are changed from experiencing a life where a child must
make “deci[sions] for life and death.”184
________________________
178.
179.
180.
181.
note 77.
182.
183.
184.

See Secretary-General Report on Children 2010, supra at note 128, at ¶ 21.
WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 34–37.
Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 509 (Sept. 2, 1998).
See generally Secretary-General Report on Children 2010, supra note 86; see also WESSELLS, supra
See WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 37–38.
See id. at 154–61.
Id. at 174.
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Cultural genocide is a concept that deserves attention. This concept was
specifically left out of the Genocide Convention.185 However, the forcible transfer
of children provision, an alternative to the cultural genocide theory, was included
in the Genocide Convention at the Sixth Committee.186 William Schabas put forth a
strong theoretical argument for the forcible transfer of children to another group as
being cultural genocide.
The mental element of . . . [forcibly transferring children of the
group to another group] does not appear to pose any particular
difficulties. The offender must have the specific intent to transfer
forcibly children of the group to another group. The offender must
have knowledge of the fact that children belong to one group, and
that they are being transferred to another group. Thus, an
individual who perpetrated the transfer of children from a victim
group would have to know that the children were in fact members
of the group. Similarly, he or she would have to know that what
the children were being transferred to was in fact another group.
[This provision] . . . is somewhat anomalous, because it
contemplates what is in reality a form of cultural genocide, despite
the clear decision of the drafters to exclude cultural genocide from
the scope of the Convention. As a result, in prosecution of the
perpetrator of the crime defined by … [the provision], the
prosecution would be required to prove the intent “to destroy” the
group in a cultural sense rather than in a physical or biological
sense.187
Both Akayesu and Schabas provide direction and insight into the context of
removing children from their group and implementing them into armed groups.
Akayesu provides a jurisprudential definition for this provision of genocide.188
Schabas provides an excellent parallel of reasoning behind the provision.189
Schabas’s work applied to actions of certain armed groups, such as the LRA,
where children are abducted from their families and villages, is a supportive
argument when discussing intent.190 The argument of one abducting a child from a
home or village and subsequently indoctrinating that child into a militaristic culture
is a small inferential argument.
________________________
185.
See The Genocide Convention, supra note 20.
186.
See MACHTELD BOOT, GENOCIDE, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND WAR CRIMES: NULLUM CRIMEN
SINE LEGE AND THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 450 (Intersentia
Uitgevers N.V. 2002). Boot includes extensive research pertaining to genocide and is more compendious than this
paper need be.
187.
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 294 (Cambridge University Press 2d ed.
2009).
188.
See id. at 202.
189.
See id. at 294.
190.
WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 39.
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The meaning of “forcibly” is also a matter in need of discussion. It is not
specifically required that the transfer of children need occur as a result of brute
force or coercion.191 An entity that governs or has de facto control over an area may
result in a genocidal act by directing children to transfer groups.192 The children or
their organic group (family, tribe, or community) may “obediently perform” such a
direction by the governing body and this could still be an act of genocide.193
“Forcing” children to adopt the dominant language, or another culture (such as a
militaristic culture), can result in a form of “linguistic and/or cultural genocide,”
also referred to as “ethnocide.”194
The dangers resulting from moving children out of their organic group have, as
shown above, been recognized widely. Children that are “forced” into child
soldiering may not only lose important opportunities to learn and pass on their
culture during the absence from their organic group, but also may be secluded or
stigmatized after they are no longer a soldier and decide to try to acclimate back to
civilian life.195 Some children are required to commit egregious acts of violence
during their initial induction into an armed group.196 In order to “cut child recruits
off from their former lives,” they were “hardened” by being forced, by the
Revolutionary United Front, known as the RUF in Sierra Leone, to kill family
members or neighbors.197 This creates a perpetual cycle that assists, specifically in
Africa, a continued cultural deterioration. Child soldiering and the cultural fallout
of “forced” transfer stands out, specifically, in Africa due to the multitude of issues
surrounding post-colonial Africa. Africa has been on the leading edge in
recognizing children’s rights, particularly as they pertain to armed conflict.198
In summary, many governments and de facto governing, or power sharing,
military groups such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Sudan People’s Liberation
Army in the Sudan “forcibly” transfer children into their armed groups for
purposes of providing additional manpower for use in armed conflict.199 This
transfer is tantamount to destroying not only children as a whole, but also the
national, ethnic, racial, or religious (and cultural) group they are also a part of. For
these reasons, the “forcible” transfer of children by armed groups, for the purpose
of using those children in armed conflict, constitutes genocide due to the inherent
rupture in the children’s cultural, linguistic, religious, legal, and familial traditions.

________________________
191.
BOOT, supra note 186, at 450.
192.
See id.
193.
Id.
194.
U.N. Economic and Social Council, ¶ 5, GA/E/C.19/2008/7 (Feb. 8 2008).
195.
See WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 160.
196.
See id. at 59.
197.
Id.
198.
See JEREMY I. LEVITT ET AL., AFRICA: MAPPING NEW BOUNDARIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 155–56
(Jeremy I. Levitt ed., Hart Publishing 2008). Chapter five is particularly on point with Africa’s advancement of
children’s rights in the midst of armed conflict.
199.
See generally WESSELLS, supra note 77, at 33–34.
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CONCLUSION
The Genocide Convention has been interpreted by International Criminal
Tribunals.200 Particularly, Akayesu provides the most analogous circumstance for
application to define children as a group.201 The above discussion shows a
substantial argument for children to be defined as people that have not attained
eighteen years of age. This paper recognizes the difficulties in establishing an age
acceptable to all cultures. Nonetheless, the CRC Protocol I is a viable international
“thermometer” on the issue of age.
Children exhibit the qualities defined in Akayesu for identification as a group.
This paper shows that a substantial argument can be made for each element of
genocide. Using interpretations of the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute,
each element and the requirement of genocidal intent were examined independently
via instances occurring around the world.
Genocidal intent may possibly occur when children are targeted specifically
because of their age and relative mental immaturity when it comes to
understanding the consequences of armed conflict. Further, the relative ease of
indoctrinating a child through violence or other coercive means implicates that
those who would seek to do so had the intent, knowledge, or should have had the
knowledge that so doing would incur, for these children, a fate enumerated in one
of the genocide elements. The elements of genocide, as shown above, have
numerous and substantial arguments in the context of children being the target of
genocide via direct use and recruitment to directly participate in armed conflict.
Killing members of the group was shown by establishing the recklessness of the
lives of children once recruited or through sending children to their deaths because
they would obey without question. Causing serious bodily or mental harm was
shown mainly through the indoctrination process. Continued violence was a part of
the need to establish dominance and thus a continuing physical and/or mental
harm. Deliberately inflicting upon the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its destruction in whole or in part was shown through the grotesque
conditions children are subjected to when brought into armed groups such as
grueling forced marches and hard labor. Imposing measures intended to prevent
births from within the group was shown through the extreme sexual violence
inflicted upon both young males and females at the will of the commander or
members of armed groups in order to provide obedience to the subjects of the
sexual violence and morale, pleasure, and feelings of superiority to those inflicting
the sexual violence. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group is
shown most distinctly through children being forcibly abducted from their homes
from rebel groups such as the LRA.
In summation, children should be afforded the maximum protections available
under international law. Children can be established as a group via the criteria set
forth in Akayesu. Persons less than eighteen years of age is the definition of a child
________________________
200.
201.

See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (Sept. 2, 1998).
Id. at ¶ 511.

Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2014

25

Barry Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 5

360

Barry Law Review

Vol. 19, No. 2

under the CRC Protocol I and international support is rising toward this
definition.202 Genocidal intent can be established through the types of activities
children are directed to perform and the manner in which children are obtained.
All five elements of the Genocide Convention are occurring in varied degrees
through atrocities around the globe.203 Admittedly, the charge of genocide is not the
answer to every situation involving children and armed conflict. However, the
international community owes children every protection that can apply to the
severity of their situations. Scholarly writings, judicial opinions, and other forms of
primary and secondary soft law are the appropriate methods of assistance to help
children in these unique and precarious situations (although, perhaps not in that
specific order) short of direct humanitarian intervention. This is the proper time to
formally recognize this group and afford the support for future deterrence,
diplomatic negotiation, and guidance for criminal proceedings. The laws regarding
the composition of a group within the meaning of genocide have been shown to
directly parallel traits exhibited by children. As such, a group under the definition
of genocide should include children.

________________________
202.
203.

Protocol I, supra note 24, at 3.
The Genocide Convention, supra note 20.
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